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Advertising Legalized Gambling:
A Late Bloomer
Under the First Amendment
by
Larry D. Strate

New federal laws and court cases have put a new perspective on the
ability of the industry to advertise as it has never been able to do
before. With gaming becoming more prevalent, the acceptability of
the legal industry is making promotion easier. The author discusses
these new influences.

What do Edge Broadcasting Co. u. U.S.l, the Charity Games
Advertising Clarification Act,2 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act 3 have in common?
Separately, they impact the issues of regulating gambling advertising by virtue of being either persuasive federal case law or federal
statute which allows legal, privately-run, or charitable activities the
same advertising rights as state-conducted lotteries. ngether they
represent the threshold entry into the 21st Century in the continuing attempt to balance the interests of those seeking to advertise
legalized gambling and those seeking to reduce it.
The magnitude of gaming in America, a multi-billion dollar leisure
time industry, is impressive. That industry is disseminated among 49
states that offer some forms of gaming. Some 39 states allow interstate
betting on horse races: or presently conduct or have legalized lotterie~.~
Some 75 Indian tribes in 20 states operate 150 gaming halls5
The definition of gambling is a matter of individual state interpretation; even the forums of legalized are varied. They include, but are
not limited to, casino gambling, lotteries, card rooms, cruise ship gaming, floating river casinos, parimutuel wagering, progressive slots,
Indian reservation gaming, multi-casino computer-linked gaming systems, patron slot clubs, sports book facilities, video gaming, high-tech
slot machines, bingo parlors, horse racing, and dog racing.
The spread of gambling is not limited to the coastal states;
America's heartland also has gambling. Illinois is expected to begin via
riverboat gambling; applications have been filed for gaming on the
Mississippi, Ohio, Illinois, Des Plaines, and Fox river^.^ Indiana
approved a bill that would allow casino gambling in Gary, French Lick,
and West Baden Springs,' and Iowa approved gambling on the
Mississippi. Louisiana introduced riverboat gambling.8Missouri has
approved a bill authorizing riverboat gambling on the Mississippi and

Missouri rivers, subject to voter appr~val.~
Casino ships are allowed to
operate out of the Gulf Coast in international waters.1° Pennsylvania
recently passed a bill authorizing riverboat gambling." South Dakota
began gambling in Deadwood in November 1989, with slot machines,
blackjack, and poker.12 A constitutional amendment would be neceswere to adopt gaming. Even Nevada has changed.
sary if Wis~onsin'~
In 1991, the Nevada legislature amended its 1864 constitution to
authorize the operation of charitable lotteries.14
The acceptability of gaming extends beyond the shores of the
United States. There is an increased interest in gaming-related ventures throughout South America, the Caribbean, the Eastern bloc
countries of Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as Sweden,
Norway, and Finland, with continued expansion in Canada and New
Zealand.15"International gaming at a glance," published in Gaming
& Wagering Business, lists 68 countries in addition to the United
States which permit activities such as bingo, cock fighting, casinos,
greyhounds, horseracing, jai-alai, lottery, pools, off-track betting, slot
machines, and others.16
The changing technology in the communications industry has
contributed to the spread and popularity of gambling as "broadcast
signals, as a technological matter, which cannot be confined to political boundaries."" The future of gaming and wagering may include
interactive television shows and telephone betting.
The Federal Communications Commission was created by the
Communications Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.; 21 U.S.C.; 47 U.S.C. 35, 151)
to regulate interstate and foreign communications by wire and radio,
reflecting the changing technology. It was assigned additional regulatory jurisdiction via the provisions of the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962 (47 U.S.C. 701-744). Its scope now includes radio and television broadcasting; telephone, telegraph, cable television, two-way
radio, and radio operators; and satellite communication.
Lottery Statute Dates to 1892
When the lottery statute was enacted in 1892, it was assumed
that the government had virtually unlimited authority to regulate
the content of commercial advertising. The purpose of the original
federal lottery statute-18 U.S.C. #1304, and 1307-was to prevent
the advertising of fraud in games of chance, pyramid schemes, fake
drawings, and other confidence games. The pertinent section of the
lottery statute reads in part:

Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station for which a
license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, and advertisement of or information concerning
any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme...shall be fined
not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both ...I8

Corresponding regulations are also contained in 47 C.F.R. part
73.1211. Those regulations state that the FCC ... "may revoke any
station license...for the violation of section 1304." An additional
statute also provides for a civil or forfeiture penalty not to exceed
$1,000 in the event of a section 1304 violation.lg
Reflecting the tenor of time, an early U.S. Supreme Court opinion reasoned as follows:
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling
are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with
the widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests the
whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every
class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor, and it plunders the ignorant and simple.20
The restrictions contained in the U.S. Code, intending to stifle
the threat of fraudulent enterprises via criminal and civil penalties (including jail sentences and fines), applied to those individuals considered nefarious. It also applied to any other person
operating a lottery or wagering, such as a church, or philanthropic
organization.
Lotteries and bingo have been authorized in many states for
church groups, charities and other qualified nonprofit organizations. Currently, advertising and detailed information concerning these fundraising activities cannot be broadcast or
distributed by newspapers send by mail or out-of-state by
other means. This significantly decreases the revenues that
church and charitable organizations raise.
It is incongruous that the Congress, at a time when churches
and charities in the private sector are increasingly assuming the
burden of many social programs, should stand in the way of those
states which have made a policy determination that churches and
charities can use lotteries and raffles as a means of raising desperately-needed revenues.21
The inability of the industry to advertise has been a problem for
the legitimate gambling interests in the United States for a long
time. What has been a problem for the gaming industry has not necessarily been a problem for other legitimate businesses in the United
States. As recently as 1984, before a U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing in Washington, D.C., the dilemma facing the gaming industry
was summed in testimony:
It is important to remember, however, that the gaming industry
is but one segment of the growing entertainment/ leisure time
industry... We are not asking for special treatment, but rather

we are asking for equal treatment. We would like to be able to
compete with others for the entertainment dollar."
FCC Can Enforce Prohibitions
The FCC was empowered to enforce the prohibitions on broadcast
information on lotteries, and issued regulations prohibiting broadcasters from carrying advertisements of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar schemez3
The FCC interpreted those prohibitions to include all forms of
gambling, while the Department of Justice and the Postal Service
either limited the prohibition to illegal lotteries or questioned the constitutionality of the laws themselves. Confusion seemed to reign
because of the inconsistency of FCC interpretation, because it seemed
Legislative histo vary depending on who was doing the inter~reting.'~
tory indicated Congress meant to only limit lotteries, whether legal or
illegal. They apparently did not intend to limit lotteries by charity, but
their good wishes were swept aside by the poorly-worded statute.25
The only exception to the otherwise sweeping ban on gaming
advertising was created in 1975 as 18 U.S.C. #1307, which permits
state-run lotteries to advertise in the state holding the game and in
adjacent states that themselves conduct lotteries.
In 1984, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate held hearings appropriately entitled "Modernizing Federal
Restrictions on Gaming Advertising." Despite being sponsored by an
influential Nevada Republican who chaired the Judiciary's Criminal
Law Subcommittee, S. 1876 - S. Rept. 98-537 advanced no fkther.26Its
recommendations would serve as a forerunner to the Charity Games
Advertising Clarification Act of 1988."
The committee observed the drastic changes from the time when
lotteries and gambling activities were privately run and unregulated,
to a time 100 years later when almost all states authorized some form
of lottery or gambling activity. In the interest of fairness, legal privately-run or charitable activities should enjoy the same rights as stateconducted lotteries.
Carving another exemption into the old law, this new statute
allows advertising in interstate commerce of all legal lotteries, gift
enterprises, and similar activities. The bill removes federal restrictions
on the advertising of legitimate lotteries and gambling activities in
interstate commerce, whether conducted by public, private, or charitable interests.28
No attempt was made to limit the rights of the individual states to
restrict such advertising under state law. In fact, there was a delay
mechanism in order to allow each state time to enact legislation to prohibit this type of advertising within the boundaries of an individual
state. The committee made it very clear that illegal gambling activities
were not to be advertised.
In the memorandum on the final compromise, because almost all
states authorized some form of lottery or gambling activity, the com-

rnittee concluded that the federal government "should not necessarily
restrict the free flow of information about such lawful activitie~."~~
Indian Gaming Regulation Is Issue
The next federal statute represented a new frontier for gaming
-that of Indian reservations and gambling. The development of
gaming on Indian lands is not surprising as gaming has become
more prevalent. Current estimates of revenue generated on Indian
lands are over $ 1billion. Some 300 Indian tribes have 108 gambling
facilities on Indian lands within the states' geographical boundaries,
and, of those, 104 have bingo, 93 pull-tabs or punch card games, four
casino gambling, and 15 other gambling activities3'
The regulation of Indian lands has generally been the province
of the U.S. Congress. The regulation of gaming-related activities has
traditionally been considered within each state's general police
power. Although social attitudes and legal proscriptions regarding
gambling have seemingly eased in the intervening century, the
desire of a state to regulate gambling is still respected by the courts.31
But because of the potential source of revenue available from gambling on Indian lands, Indian tribes, states, federal regulatory agencies, Congress, and the court system have been on a collision course.32
The state of California wanted to regulate the Cabazon Indian
bingo games, as did the county of Riverside. In 1987, the decision in
State of California v. Cabazon Indians33barred states from regulating Indian gaming.
The holding by the Court was in keeping with its precedents
regarding sovereignty, that Indian tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory"34and that "tribal
sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only the federal government, not the states."35
With judicial fuel added to the volatile issue, the collision of
interests culminated when seven proposals to regulate gaming on
Indian lands were introduced into the 99th Congress. It was the
100th Congressional session t h a t passed the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. The issues which Congress sought to resolve with
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act included the practical resolution
to the legitimate competing concerns of tribal sovereignty, state burden, and federal interest, as well as how states like Nevada, with a
regulated gaming industry, can function with potentially unregulated casino gambling either near or next to existing regulated games.36
The act created a three-tiered system whereby tribes would control ceremonial games, the federal government would control bingo,
and the state and tribes would negotiate agreements to cover casino
games, parimutuel racing, and jai-alai, if such games were legal in
that particular state.
According to Anthony J. Hop, chairman of the National Indian
Gaming Commission, there are some 150 gambling halls operated by
75 tribes in 20 states, most for bingo, with a combined gross revenue

of $1 billion a year.37Since the 1988 law was enacted, 16 casino gambling compacts have been reached in five states, but most of the casinos have not yet opened. More t h a n a dozen other tribes in
Washington, New York, Arizona, New Mexico, Florida, Mississippi,
and Nevada are negotiating similar compacts.3s
An important aspect to the development of gaming on Indian
reservations has to do with restrictions on advertising. There are
none. Any form of gambling available in the state may be offered,
and Indians are not bound by any federal or state criminal codes limiting the use of mail, broadcast television, or telephone. As an example, satellite MegaBingo quickly lined up over 20 reservations for its
guaranteed $500,000 prize game.39
Putting policy questions aside, the last two decades of judicial
determination have held that commercial speech is under the protection of the First Amendment, even though to a lesser extent than
that protection extended to non-commercial speech. Notwithstanding
the Department of Justice's observation that these judicial decisions
"cast serious doubt upon the enf~rceability"~"
of federal criminal
statutes prohibiting the mailing or broadcasting of advertisements .
and information concerning lawful gaming enterprises, the statutes
need modification to conform to the mandates of First Amendment
commercial speech case law.
Several Cases Impact the Advertising of Gaming
A series of cases begun in 1975 have extended protection of the
First Amendment to commercial speech. In 1978 Justice Scalia wrote
that commercial speech enjoys "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values, and is subject to modes of regulation that might
be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.'"'
Justice White wrote in 1968: "Broadcasting is clearly a medium
affected by a First Amendment interest.'"' The Supreme Court indicated
that Congress possesses greater latitude to regulate broadcasting than
other forms of communication. Justice Marshall observed in 1983: "Our
decisions have recognized that the special interest of the federal government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into
a justification for regulation of other means of co~nmunication."~~
In a 1970 case, the Supreme Court specifically extended to radio
coverage the power of Congress constitutionally to restrict the interstate dissemination of lottery materials recognized in Ex parte
Rapier, 143 U.S. 133,12 S.Ct. 374,36 L.Ed. 93 (1892).
Nearly a century ago in Ex parte Rapier,44Congress enacted a
complete ban on the importation, mailing, and advertisement of lotteries, and extended t h a t prohibition to broadcasting by the
Communications Act of 1934.45
Bigelow v. Virginia46is the first case of major interest to legal
gambling. Bigelow involved an advertisement for abortion services
available in New York which was placed in a Virginia publication.

New York had chosen to legalize abortions and was advertising that
fact. However, Virginia had not only decided to outlaw abortions, but
it passed a statute prohibiting the publication of any information
about abortions. The Supreme Court struck down the state law, holding the abortion advertisement protected by the First Amendment.
A second major breakthrough came in a 1976 case. For the first
time the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects
commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. In
Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
the
Court struck down state restrictions on price advertising by pharmacists as unconstitutional.
The next two cases followed quickly: Carey v. Population Services
International 48 struck down a ban on any "advertisement or display" of
contraceptives, and Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public
Services C o r n m i ~ s i o ninvolved
~~
promotional advertising by utilities.
Supreme Court Covers Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court explained its reasons for expanding protections of the First Amendment to cover commercial speech. The Court
"rejected the highly paternalistic view that government has complete
power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. People will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and the best means to that end is to open the channels of communications, rather than to close them."50
While commercial advertising is entitled to less protection under
the First Amendment than non-commercial speech, it nonetheless
has been afforded significant First Amendment safeguards since it
"not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of informati~n."~'
In a prelude to the case enunciating a four-part analysis for
determining the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial
, ~ ~Supreme
speech, Zaurder v. Office of Disciplinary C o u n ~ e lthe
Court insisted that a state must identify a direct link between the
interest asserted and the regulation a t issue. "Commercial speech
that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activity. ..may be restricted only in the service of substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance the
interest." The Court concluded: "But as we stated above, broad
prophylactic rules may not be so lightly justified if the protections
afforded commercial speech are to retain their force."53
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric C ~ r p . , 'Justice
~
Powell enunciated that traditional four-part analysis for determining the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial free
speech to come within the provision, it must at least concern

lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve the interest.55
Four-Part Test Provides Framework
This four-part test has been accepted as the analytical framework
for determining the constitutionality of restrictions upon commercial
speech.56This test was used in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Co.? where the Court dealt with the ability of the legislature
to allow the advertising of casino gambling directed toward tourists,
yet prohibited similar advertising toward residents.
The threshold determination was whether or not the advertising
concerned a lawful activity, and was not misleading. The gaming was a
lawful activity and not mi~leading.~'
The next step was to determine
whether the Puerto Rican government's interest in reducing the
demand for casino gambling by residents was related to the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens. The second test was valid.59
The third part of the test was whether or not the challenged
restrictions directly advanced the government's interest. Advertising
of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would tend
to increase the demand for the product advertised. The third test
was reasonable.'jO
The fourth part of the test was whether the restrictions were no
more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest.
The narrow construction announced by the Puerto Rican court via
legislative fiat would not affect the advertising of casino gambling
aimed at tourists, but would apply to such advertising only when
aimed at the residents of the Commonwealth. The restrictions were
held to be no more extensive than necessary.'jl
The legislative history of the Puerto Rican Act reads as follows:

Excessive casino gambling among residents ...would produce
serious harmful effects on the health, safety, and welfare of
the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and
cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of
prostitution, the development of corruption and the infiltration of organized crime. [Brief for Appellee 33.1
This is the same legislature that sought to protect horseracing,
cockfighting, "picas" or small games of chance at fiestas, and the lottery on the grounds that they had been traditionally part of Puerto
Rican roots.
It is important to note the impressive dissenting opinions. Justice
Brennan, in his minority opinion, flatly stated: "I do not believe that
Puerto Rico constitutionally may suppress truthful commercials engag-

ing in lawful activity. While tipping its hat to these standards, the
Court does little more than defer to what it perceives to be the determination by Puerto Rico's legislature that a ban on casino advertising
aimed at residents is reasonable." The Court totally ignored the fact
that commercial speech is entitled to substantial First Amendment protection, giving the government unprecedented authority to eviscerate
constitutionally-protected expression." Justice Brennan described
Posadas as "dramatically shrinking the scope of First Amendment protection available to commercial speech.'"j3
An equally strong dissent was written by Justice Stevens:
Whether a State may ban all advertising of an activity that it
permits but could prohibit-such as gambling, prostitution, or
the consumption of marijuana or liquor-is an elegant question of constitutional law. It is not, however, appropriate to
address that question in this case because Puerto Rico's
rather bizarre restraints on speech are so apparently forbidden by the First Amendment.64
In 1989, another case addressed the more specific issue of the
fourth part of the Central Hudson test, whether or not government
restrictions upon commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond the
least restrictive means to achieve the desired end. In Board of
Dustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,65the Court decided that the least restrictive means test is no longer applicable.
The least restrictive test is not to be applied in the determination
of the validity of restrictions on commercial speech under the free
speech provisions of the Constitution's First Amendment. The Court
reasoned that commercial speech enjoys a limited measure of protection commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values, and is subject to modes of regulation that might
be impermissible in the realm of non-commercial expression. The
ample scope of regulatory authority suggested by such doctrines would
be illusory under a least-restrictive-means requirement, and while the
free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify
imposing on would-be regulators the cost of distinguishing the harmless from the harmful, prior cases have not imposed the burden of
demonstrating that the distinguishing is 100 percent complete, or by
the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will
achieve the desired ends; instead, what is required is a fit between the
legislature's ends and the means closest to accomplish those ends that
is not necessarily perfectly reasonable, or represents not necessarily
the single best disposition, but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interests served, and employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means, but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective
within such bounds. It is for governmental decision makers to judge
what manner of regulation may best be employed; the narrowly-tailored-means test is not overly permissive of government r e g u l a t i ~ n . ~ ~

Current Cases Explore Restrictions
Edge Broadcasting Corporation [Edge], with its principal place
of business in Virginia, operated WMYK-FM (aka Power 94),
licensed by the FCC, and broadcasting from Moyock, North Carolina.
Power 94 is one of 24 commercial radio stations serving the
Hampton Roads, Virginia, metropolitan area.
The State of North Carolina does not sponsor a lottery and its
statutes make participating in and the advertising of non-exempt
raffles and lotteries a misdemeanor.'j7 The Commonwealth of
Virginia, however, does authorize a lottery, and since 1988 has conducted lottery games.68
Edge challenges the constitutionality of the two provisions of the
federal lottery statute, as well as seeks clarification of its position of
liability in North Carolina.
According to one survey, approximately 92.2 percent of the population of the listening audience reside in Virginia and 7.89 percent
reside in North Carolina.'j9Virginia authorizes a lottery. Edge estimates that it derives more the 95 percent of its local advertising revenues from sources in the State of Virginia, but fearful of being
subject to criminal or civil penalties, it has not broadcast any advertisements promoting the Virginia lottery. As a result, it estimates
lost advertising revenue in the millions of dollars. For example, in
1988, Virginia paid $1,285,141 in media advertising; in 1989 expenditures were estimated at $2,300,000.70Advertising space was also
purchased in the area's two largest newspapers, both of which circulate in the North Carolina counties also reached by Power 94's signal. It was estimated that 75 percent of all television viewing in
these same nine counties is directed to Virginia television stations
which carry lottery ad~ertising.~'
Utilizing the four-part Central Hudson test, and incorporating
Board of Dustees of SUAWs test- "a narrowly tailored-means test,"
Edge Broadcasting Co. v. U.S.'?efleds current First Amendment protection of commercial speech based on the information function of
advertising, the social recognition that '%roadcast signals, as a technoas American
logical matter, cannot be confined to political boundaries'773
habits show that adults spend 29 percent of their media consumption
listening to the radio and 60 percent watching tele~ision.~~
Commercial Speech Must Be Informational
The principle that the First Amendment's concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising is the focal
point of the first part of the Central Hudson 75 test. It examines whether
and whether the information imparted
the activity spoken of its la*,
is truthful. "There can be no constitutional objection to the suppression
of commercial messages that does not accurately inform the public
The legality of advertising about the Virginia
about lawful a~tivity."~~
lottery was undisputed. It was lawfully created by the state's voters in a
November 3,1987, referendum and established by Virginia.77

The second part of the test is concerned with the substantiality
of government intent. The interest served by Sections 1304 and 1307
is the furtherance of fundamental interest of federalism enabling
non-lottery states to discourage gambling.78These interests are similar to other "substantial" interests which have been accepted as complying with Central Hudson's second standard. For example, a state
statutory prohibition of liquor advertising-a restriction designed to
reduce consumption of alcohol-has been upheld,ig and a state law
restriction on utility advertising designed to reduce energy consumption has been recognized as valid." Congress may assist states in
inhibiting activities considered by a state to be contrary to public policy by regulating the promotion by radio broadcasting." The "substantial interest" standard is not a strict one.s2In Posadas, the
Supreme Court recognized Puerto Rico's substantial interest in the
reduction of gambling, even though the regulation a t issue only
restricted selected forms of advertising of casino gambling, while permitting advertising of other forms of gamb1ingaa3
The third part of the Central Hudson test requires that a restriction on protected commercial speech directly advance the interest of
the jurisdiction where the legislation is being challenged. If a prohibition provides only "ineffective or remote support" for such objectives, it fails under the First Amendment.'"
The disputed section noted #I304 and 1307 (at footnote eight)
constitutes ineffective means of reducing lottery participation by
North Carolina residents, because they receive most of the radio,
newspaper, and television communication from Virginia's local
media. It is probably true that a relatively small number of North
Carolina listeners may hear significantly less lottery advertising
because of their allegiance to one station and that other North
Carolinians may hear slightly less lottery advertising because they
occasionally listen to Power 94. However, these possibilities do not
sufficiently constitute "direct advancement" of the state's interest
under the third part of Central Hudson test which makes it clear
that "conditional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify
silencing...promotional ad~ertising."'~
The application of section 1304 to Edge can only speculatively
advance the goals of the state of North Carolina. Moreover, to the
extent that that provision does reduce lottery participation by North
Carolina residents, that reduction is necessarily so slight as to be
kind of "remote" support rejected in Central Hudson as not "directly
advancing" either interests of federalism or limitations on lottery
saled6 Thus, the application of sections #I304 and 1307 to Edge's
operation of Power 94 is constitutionally invalid.
The final step and fourth part of the Central Hudson test is that a
restriction on commercial speech may be no more extensive than necCentral Hudson's "least
essary to further the "state's intere~t."'~
restrictive alternative" is replaced by and interpreted according to the
"narrowly tailored test of Board of Dustees of SUNY. Justice Scalia

interpreted this part of the test as establishing "something short of a
least restrictive standard, and described it as based on 'reasonable7legislative
necessitating a fit that is not necessarily perfect,
but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served; that
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means."
The statutory scheme put in place is not unreasonable.
Presumably in many instances, broadcasters located in non-lottery
states will serve substantial populations in those states. Under such
circumstances, there may be a "fit" between the statue and its objectives. Accordingly, these sections do pass under Board of Dustees of
SUNTs relaxation of the fourth Central Hudson's standard.
The question has been raised by commentators with regard to
what they believe is an inconsistency between Justice Rehnquist's
approach in Posadas and the standards of Central Hud~on.~'
Based
upon the dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, during recent hearings concerning section 1304 and related statutory provisions, a Justice
Department representative stated that the Posadas analysis "certainly contrasts with the approach in Central Hudson, and that "it
remains to be seen whether the Court in future cases will take the
established Central Hudson approach, or rely on Posadas' blank deference to the legi~lature."~
Two federal statutes and one federal case serve as the threshold
for entering the next century in the continuing attempt to balance the
interests of those seeking to advertise legalized gambling and those
seeking to reduce it. The growth of gaming in the last century makes it
a billion dollar industry and a source of revenue for state and local
entities. With the exception of Indian gaming on reservations, some 49
states offer some form of gaming they regulate; 39 states allow betting
on horses; 33 states have legalized lotteries. Some 75 Indian tribes of
the 300 existing in 20 states operate 150 gaming halls. Gaming
extends along the shores of the U.S. and gaming interest extends to 68
countries in addition to the U.S. The future of the gaming industry is
inextricably linked to advertising.
Recognizing that broadcast signals, as a technological matter, cannot be confined to political boundaries, this decade sees continuing technological development in cable and satellite communication. In 1975,
one exception to the prohibitive federal statutes was created permitting
state-run lotteries to advertise in the state or in adjacent ones that also
permitted lotteries. In 1988, the Charity Games Advertising
Clarification Act removed federal restrictions on the advertising of legitimate lotteries and gambling activities in interstate commerce, whether
conducted by public, private, or charitable interests.
Gambling is a late blooming legal business; it was also late in
gaining access to the courts to collect legal obligations, and late in
gaining recognition of commercial speech protection. The Central
Hudson test was modified to replace the least restrictive means by

the Fox narrowly-tailored-means tests. Edge Broadcasting Corp.
found protection for its broadcasting of lottery information and other
advertising, even though it operated from Virginia where lotteries
were legal, but broadcast from and into North Carolina where lotteries were not legal. The Supreme Court found that restriction of the
statutes speculatively advanced the goals of the state of North
Carolina, and the reduction was so slight as to be the kind of remote
support not directly advancing either interests of federalism or limitations on lottery sales. The strong dissents in Posadas pose future
questions as it remains to be seen whether the Court in future cases
will take the established approach in Central Hudson or rely on
Posadas' blank deference to the legislature.
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